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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
While the majority opinion appears to be generally consistent with
precedent, its position may often result in the exclusion of the only available
evidence, when through the normal course of events the most desirable evidence
is unavailable. Sufficient proof may be at hand, as in this case, to render a decision
morally certain. Surely the report of an investigation conducted by responsible
and impartial hospital employees at the time of the incident is to some degree
credible. Some jurisdictions6 have met such problems by enacting statutes
permitting the trial court under certain circumstances to admit into evidence the
declaration of a deceased person in spite of the hearsay rule.
Presumption of Continuity of Ownership
In People v. Scandore7 defendant was charged with unlawful construction
within a restricted area, and without a permit, of parts of a building.8 At the trial
the prosecution offered in evidence a deed showing defendant as grantee of the
premises in question. Although the deed had been recorded nine years before
the alleged violations, defendant made no objection as to its evidentiary value. On
appeal, following conviction, however, defendant claimed that the deed was
insufficient to prove that he had been the owner of the premises as of the
critical date.
In unanimously reversing the Appellate Division and reinstating the
conviction of the defendant, the Court of Appeals made use of a well-established
principle in the law, the presumption of continuity or, as it is sometimes called,
the presumption against change. This rule is to the effect that once conditions of
a continuous nature are proved to exist, their continuance will be presumed for
so long as is usual with things of like nature.9
The Court reasoned that since a recorded deed is the customary way of
indicating ownership,10 defendant's ownership will be presumed to have continued
down to the critical date." It concluded that it would be unreal to reverse
6. For example Massachusetts' Laws, 1898, ch. 535, as amended, 1920, ch.
233 §65 provides:
A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmis-
sible in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation be-
tween husband and wife if the Court finds it was made in
good faith before the commencement of the action and
upon personal knowledge of the declarant.
7. 3 N.Y.2d 681, 171 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1958).
8. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK §532-11.0. NEW YORK
CITY DEPARTMENT OF PARKS, RULES AND REGULATIONS §60.
9. RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, §73 (8th ed. 1955). Such a presumption is
far from being irrebutable or conclusive and its strength and duration will be
determined by the facts and rationale which support it. See Maggio v. Zeitz,
33 U.S. 56, 65 (1947).
10. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §384. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §392 provides:
The rules of evidence in civil cases are applicable also to
criminal cases, except as otherwise provided in this Code.
11. Accord: Collins v. Streitz, 95 F.2d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1938). See Wilkins
v. Earle, 44 N.Y. 172, 192 (1820).
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defendant's conviction, particularly since he never raised the issue of ownership
until appeal.
12
Little sympathy can be felt for the plight of the defendant. Certainly, the
defendant knew whether or nc t he was the owner of the premises, and it does
not seem to be placing an undue burden on him to require that he contest his
ownership, once the deed is placed in evidence. If he had, in some manner,
taken issue as to the sufficiency of the deed fixing his ownership, the prosecution
would have been given an opportunity to supply additional proo; in the matter.
Admissibility of Confession
Although confessions obtained during the course of an illegal detention are
summarily excluded from evidence in the federal courts,13 in the courts of New
York State such confessions are considered as evidence if the jury finds them to
have been voluntarily made.14 However, the federal rule has been limited to
cases where the confession was obtained during the illegal portion of the period
before arraignment. U. S. v. Mitchell'5 held that where the illegal delay began
after the confession was procured such delay was immaterial to the issue of
admissibility.16
The rationale of the Mitchell case has been incorporated into New York
law by the unanimous decision of the Court -in the case of People v. Scully.
17
There the Court held that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to charge
that the delay in arraignment, subsequent to the procuring of the confession, was
unnecessary as a matter of law. In cases where the confession was obtained
during the course of an illegal detention it has been held error not to so charge.' 8
Thus the time of the confession and not the time of arraignment is the controlling
circumstance.
The Court's rationale is that, since the confession was procured before the
detention became illegal, no disclosure was induced by the illegal delay. The
illegality of the detention does not retroactively change the circumstances under
which disclosures were made.' 9
12. There was other evidence in the record showing defendant as owner
of the premises as late as one year before the critical date.
13. McNabb v. U. S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. U. S., 354 U.S. 449
(1957).
14. People v. Mummiani, 58 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94 (1932).
15. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
16. Accord, Symons v. U. S., 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1949); People v. Zam-
mara, 66 Cal. App. 166, 152 P.2d 180 (1944); Mares v. Hill, 118 Utah 484, 222
P.2d 811 (1950).
17. 4 N.Y.2d 453, 176 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1958).
18. People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934).
19. Cf. State v. Jenkins, 1 Vt. 377 (1803), where court held threats of
violence made after defendant confessed to be of no consequence.
